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In this paper I study the abnormal returns of different subsample of rival firms of 
takeover targets at their takeover announcement. Using latest data from 1990 to 2013, 
I confirm that rival firms earn positive and significant returns over target 
announcement period. Furthermore, after dividing the rivals into large rival portfolio 
and small rival portfolio, results show that the positive abnormal return is primarily 
earned by large rivals rather than small rivals. It is consistent with the hypothesis that 
large rival firms in the industry are expected to benefit more in the event of initial 
takeover, and large rivals are expected to become more competitive after initial 
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Various studies have found empirical evidences that rival firms of an acquisition 
target earn positive abnormal returns on the target’s announcement, but few studies 
distinguish between rival firm characteristics and how they affect the rival firm’s 
abnormal return. In this paper I find that different rival firms do not necessarily obtain 
the same level of abnormal return. According to my results, rival abnormal returns on 
the day of initial takeover announcement are mostly earned by large rivals rather than 
small rivals, as large rivals are expected to benefit more from the information of 
initial takeover announcement, and are expected to become more competitive than 
small rivals. 
Previous researches observe that rival firms earn significant abnormal returns on 
initial target’s takeover announcement day. Eckbo (1983) observes significant 
positive abnormal returns on rival firms of horizontal merger targets. Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) also find positive returns on rival firms. Several hypothesis have 
been developed to explain the abnormal returns on rival firms. The collusion 
hypothesis suggest collusion between merging firm and rivals in the industry, but the 
hypothesis has been rejected by Eckbo (1983, 1985). Song and Walkling (1999) 
develop the acquisition probability hypothesis, which explains rival abnormal return 
with increased probability of becoming a target. Furthermore, the market power 
hypothesis by Chatterjee (1986) states that rivals earn abnormal return because they 
are expected to benefit from the increased market power brought into the industry by 
merging firms, and the rivals gain positive return only if they become more cost-
efficient.  
In this paper, I also find positive and significant abnormal returns on rival firms 
when the target announces a takeover, using data from 1990 to 2013. Furthermore, I 
divide the portfolio of rival firms into a portfolio of large rivals and a portfolio of 
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small rivals, and I discover that the positive abnormal return is primarily earned by 
the large rivals. Based on the market power hypothesis, I posit that the market has 
higher expectations that large firms will benefit from the increase of market power 
induced by the merging firms. In addition, I also distinguish the initial merger 
between horizontal merger and non-horizontal merger, and discover minor differences 
between their rival return.  
Section 2 reviews the relevant studies and posit my hypothesis. Section 3 
describes the data used for analysis in this paper. Section 4 discusses the methodology 
of forming rival portfolio and calculating target and rival abnormal return using 
market model. Section 5 presents results of event study of both target and rivals’ 
abnormal returns in selected event windows during announcement period, and cross 
sectional regressions results of rival CAR on target CAR and other control variables. 




2. Literature review and hypothesis 
 
2.1 literature review 
Previous studies have observed that target firms gain positive abnormal return 
during takeover announcement period. Jensen and Ruback (1983) demonstrate that 
mergers in general create economic value. The studies of Lubatkin (1984) and Singh 
(1984) use the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to measure the abnormal return 
acquired during announcement period, and indicate that mergers create economic 
value. Moreover, it has also been discovered that rivals of the target firm also react to 
target firms’ merger announcements. Eckbo (1983) reports rivals of merging firms 
benefit from the news of horizontal merger announcement. According to his research, 
rivals of horizontal mergers that are challenged because of collusion earn on average a 
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significant positive abnormal return of 2.45% within a month around the original 
merger announcement period.  
Researches have tried to find the source explaining rival firms’ abnormal returns 
on target announcement day. Eckbo (1983) tests the collusion theory, which states 
that rival firms gain abnormal return in horizontal mergers because they benefit from 
monopolistic collusion among each other. Song and walkling (1999) suggest the 
acquisition probability hypothesis that rivals earn abnormal return on target takeover 
announcement because of their increased probability of becoming targets themselves. 
Chatterjee (1986) talk about the market efficiency theory that rivals gain abnormal 
returns because of market’s expectation that the rivals will benefit from increased 
market efficiency after the initial merger in the industry. 
The collusion theory holds that rival firms earn abnormal returns because of 
collusion within the industry allows rival firms to earn monopoly rent and monopsony 
rent. As Eckbo (1983, 1985) explains, horizontal mergers, especially the ones that 
receive antitrust challenges, promote tacit or explicit cooperation among rivals in the 
same industry, and rivals gain abnormal returns because of increased possibility of 
collusion among each other as well as with target firms. However, this theory has 
been rejected by Eckbo (1983). According to the hypothesis of collusion theory, both 
target and rivals should earn positive abnormal returns on target merger 
announcement, while target and rivals should earn negative returns when an 
announcement of antitrust challenge is issued. Eckbo tests rivals’ abnormal returns on 
horizontal merger announcements as well as antitrust announcements, and discovers 
that rivals actually gain positive abnormal returns on both merger announcement and 
antitrust announcement, which contradicts the collusion hypothesis. Moreover, Asch 
(1976) finds that collusive behavior is negatively related to firm’s profitability.  
The takeover probability hypothesis suggests that rival firms gain positive 
abnormal returns during target merger announcement period because their probability 
of being taken over has increased. Papelu (1985) claims that targets of acquisition can 
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be predicted with public data. Song and Walkling (1999) believe that the takeover 
announcement issued on the original target might cause a revaluation of the target’s 
industry, and the probability of other firms in that industry becoming targets in next 
takeover would increase. Furthermore, Song and Walkling (1999) find that the rival 
firms that actually became targets within one year after the initial target’s takeover 
announcement have significant larger CARs than the rival firms that do not become 
targets later. Also rival CAR is positively and significantly related to predicted 
probability of rivals becoming target. 
Chatterjee (1986) introduces two effects that may influence rival return: the 
product/factor-price effect and the information effect. The factor-price effect suggests 
that target firms become more cost effective after merger. Nevertheless, unless rivals 
firms are able to adopt the same cost-effective strategy as the target firms after 
merger, they will reduce in market value if they cannot become as competitive as the 
targets. The information effect argues that merger announcements pass on information 
about available technological improvements, which will increase the efficiency in the 
industry, therefore rival firms enjoy positive returns because of market expectation 
that they will also benefit from technological improvements. According to this 
hypothesis, 
Increase (or decrease) in market value = factor-price effect (loss) + information effect 
(gain) 
The factor-price effect captures the negative effect, as it describes the effect when 
rivals do not become as competitive as targets after merger and reduce in market 
value. The information effect is supposed to be positive if target and rivals are 
expected to benefit from technology. Therefore, rivals earn positive return if the sum 
of factor-price effect and information effect is positive: rivals gain positive abnormal 




As documented in various literature, firm return could be affected by the size of 
the firm. As firm size is a firm specific variable which is known before any event is 
announced (Bamber 1987), it is a variable that can help the traders, analysts and the 
market make predictions, which further affect the firm’s reaction to the event 
announcement. According to Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1986), firm size is a 
proxy for the amount of information available for traders and professional analysts to 
make prediction. Larger firms in general have better disclosure conditions for 
analysis. Moreover, they discover that predicted size-adjusted returns for large firms 
exceed small firms using various models. Different size of firms also respond 
differently to signals in the industry. Previous studies prove that large firms and small 
firms respond differently to tech innovations. According to Acs and Audretsch 
(1988), big and small firms respond differently to different stimuli. Factors affecting 
technological innovation affect big firms and small firms differently. Feldman (1994) 
states that small firm innovation appears to benefit from the presence of external 
institutions and resource. Also according to Steiner (1975), large firms have cheaper 
access to capital than small firms, so that it’s easier for large firms to adapt to the 
change in industry and improve their own competitiveness. Moreover, firm size itself 
affect the firm’s earnings according to empirical results. Studies have focused on size 
effect of the firm. Banz (1980) discovers that small firms have higher risk-adjusted 
returns than larger firms. The size effect also works for acquirers, according to 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003). They find that smaller acquiring firms gain 
higher announcement returns than larger acquirers. However, Chen(1981) argues that 
the size effect is captured by some other factors using an Arbitrage pricing model. His 
studies show that portfolios of firms of different sizes do not present significant 
difference in returns after adjusting for risk factor, so that risk explains the size effect, 
and the market is efficient. Later Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) further note that the 
higher returns of small firms compared to big firms are induced by additional risks in 
an efficient market. Several studies also link the size effect to collusion and monopoly 
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rent. Asch (1976) finds that firm size as a control variable is positively and 
significantly related to firm profit, while the degree of collusion negatively and 
significantly affect profit. Barla (2000) find that if the firm sizes in the industry 
becomes more asymmetric, collusion is more difficult to maintain.  
Apart from the size effect that influence market expectation on rival 
performance, which further affect rival return, studies show that the characteristics of 
the initial merger itself also affect rival return. Chatterjee (1986) states that rivals of 
unrelated mergers gain higher returns than related mergers. However, conglomerate 
mergers not only directly affect rival returns, but also offer strong influence on market 
power which may affect the whole industry. Mueller (1969) find that conglomerate 
mergers take place when they increase in market power, especially when the merging 
firms from different industry produce technological improvements or managerial 
economy of scale. Weston (1970) states that conglomerate mergers permit the 
extension of market power from one industry into other industries. Therefore, a 
conglomerate merger transmit market power from the industry of acquiring firm to 
target firm, therefore affecting rival firms in the same industry of the target. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis 
Based on the three major hypothesis of previous studies mentioned before, the 
rival’s positive abnormal return could be driven up by several market expectations: 
the expectation of intra-industry collusion, the expectation that the rival will become a 
future target of takeover, and the expectation of taking advantage of technology or 
managerial innovations. All these three expectations can signal the market expectation 
that rival firm benefit from the information of target takeover announcement, and it 
could be that these expectations have collective effects on rival abnormal returns. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to distinguish among these three expectations’ effect on rival 
abnormal returns. Firstly, if the market projects potential collusion between the 
merging new firm and rival firms, or between two or more rival firms, the rivals 
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increase in market value and gain positive abnormal returns, according to Eckbo 
(1983)’s hypothesis. Eckbo’s results rejects this hypothesis, which makes the 
collusion effect less possible, but it should still be noted that the data used in his 
research were in 1980s, and it still remains unclear whether the data I used in this 
paper from 1990 to 2013 support the same result as Eckbo. However, previous studies 
have not distinguished whether the collusion probability is higher among large rivals 
or among small rivals. Therefore the market expectation of intra-industry collusion 
could fall on both large and small rivals, but may differ in degree.  
The second sort of market expectation is that rivals increase in value because they 
are expected to have increased probability to become future targets. in order to reduce 
the effect of future takeover probability which might also contribute to positive 
abnormal return on rivals, I clear out the rival firms that actually became a merger 
target within one year, based on the studies of Song and Walkling (1999)‘s takeover 
probability hypothesis. According to Song and Walkling (1999), rivals that actually 
became targets within the following year gain significantly higher abnormal return 
than rivals that do not become targets. By deleting the firms that became target within 
a year, I try to reduce the influence of takeover probability. However, as the market 
cannot precisely predict which firm will become a target of future takeover, all rivals 
are still exposed to probability of becoming a target of takeover. Therefore, by 
excluding the rivals that became targets from my sample, I can reduce to the 
maximum level but still cannot eliminate the influence of takeover probability 
hypothesis. 
The third expectation that drives up rival abnormal return lies in that rival firm 
will become more cost-efficient, which is stimulated by the increased competitiveness 
of merging firms. This hypothesis is based on the theory of Chatterjee (1986). Rival 
firms earn positive return if they are expected to become more cost-efficient, while 
rivals earn negative returns if they are expected to lose competitiveness compared to 
merging firms and other rivals in the industry. More studies discover the relationship 
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between competitiveness and firm’s performances. Hunt (1997) find that firms with 
advantageous competitiveness have better financial performances. Also, Salop and 
Scheffman (1983) suggest that it is relatively less expensive for dominating firms to 
raise their rivals’ costs and improve their own competitiveness. However, I suggest 
that larger rivals and small rivals are not equal in the level of increased 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness, as previous studies provided empirical 
evidence that large firms find it easier to react to information, and are usually 
expected to earn higher returns. Therefore, I suggest a hypothesis that during the 
announcement period of the initial takeover, large rivals of the target and small rivals 
of the target are expected to benefit from the information of takeover announcement, 
but the abnormal returns acquired by rival firms may differ in degree. Large rivals are 
expected to become more competitive while small rivals are expected to be less 
competitive after the initial merger. 
In addition, as conglomerate mergers bring in market power from the acquiring 
firm’s industry in terms of technological innovation or managerial improvement, 
which affect the market power of target’s industry, I also add to the hypothesis that 
rivals may gain higher returns if the initial merger is a conglomerate rather than a 
horizontal merger, as the market expects conglomerate mergers to bring more market 
power into the industry. 
In general, my hypothesis could be illustrated in the following points: 
1. Larger rival firms of the target obtain more positive effect from the initial target 
takeover announcement than small rival firms, as the market expects large rivals 
of the original target to benefit more from the information release of the initial 
takeover announcement, and become more competitive because they become 
more cost-efficient. Small rivals are less affected by the announcement of the 
initial takeover, as the market expect less improvement and competitiveness from 
small rival firms. 
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2. Rivals of non-horizontal merger targets could benefit more from the initial non-
horizontal mergers, as non-horizontal mergers bring in information and innovation 
from outside the industry. 
If the hypotheses hold, large rivals should earn more positive abnormal returns on 
target announcement, while small rivals earn little significant abnormal returns. Rivals 
of non-horizontal mergers should also earn more positive abnormal returns on target 





3.1 Selection of mergers 
The sample of mergers from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2013 is drawn 
from Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The sample is limited to US mergers 
and acquisitions where acquirers are public firms. After collecting other data and 
satisfying for target and rival selection criteria, the sample left for event study has 
been narrowed down to 1726 mergers. 
The status of merger in SDC database is classified into Completed, Intended, 
Partly completed, Pending and Withdrawn. I identify successful mergers as the ones 
with reported status of “Completed”, and unsuccessful mergers as the ones with status 
of “Withdrawn”. The unsuccessful mergers could be either intentionally cancelled or 
naturally expired. Completed mergers are the majority of all mergers: a total of 1509 
completed mergers and 204 withdrawn mergers in the sample. 
The SDC database also provide information about target and acquirer firms’ 
industry identification by 4-digit SIC codes. I reclassify target and acquirer’s 
industries into a more general industry identification by using 3-digit SIC codes. 
Therefore, I identify the merger as a horizontal merger if target’s 3-digit SIC code is 
the same as its acquirer’s 3-digit SIC code. The merger is identified as a non-
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horizontal merger if the target’s 3-digit SIC code is different from its acquirer’s 3-
digit SIC code. From 1990 to 2013, there are 994 horizontal mergers and 732 non-
horizontal mergers in this sample after cleaning data for further steps. 
 
3.2 Selection of rivals 
The rivals of a certain merger target are chosen as the horizontal rival firms in 
the same industry as the target. To obtain the rival firms, I take all firms in CRSP 
which have the same SIC codes as the target in each industry. All other firms 
excluding the target itself are identified as rivals of that target. Of all the merger 
targets, there are a total of 330 industries identified by 330 3-digit SIC codes. All 
firms excluding targets in these 330 industries consist of the initial sample of rival 
firms. For each merger event, the rivals are grouped into an equally weighted or value 
weighted portfolio to match the target. 
The number of firms in each industry vary largely. The industry with the largest 
number of firms is Investment Offices (SIC code 672), with 2649 firms in total, 
followed by Computer Programming, Data Processing, And Other Computer Related 
Services (SIC code 737), with 1557 firms. As some industry groups contain too few 
firms for analysis, I deleted the industries with less than 10 firms, so that for the target 
firm in each merger event, there are at least 9 horizontal rival firms. 
Furthermore, for each merger announcement, I create a portfolio of large rivals 
which only consists of rivals that are bigger than industry median market value, and a 
portfolio of small rivals which consists rivals that are smaller than industry median 
market value. Therefore, apart from the rival portfolio consisting of all other firms in 
the industry with the same 3 digit SIC code as the target firm, one target in a merger 
event is matched to two additional rival portfolios: the big rival portfolio and the 
small rival portfolio. I use the market value as a proxy for firm size, and the data to 




3.3 Selection of targets 
As an acquisition of firms with a tiny market value are expected to have little 
influence on the whole industry, I want my merger samples to be major merger and 
acquisitions in the industry, which can possibly exert an influence on the abnormal 
returns of other firms in the industry. Therefore, I only keep the mergers in which the 
target’s market value is larger than the industry median market value.  
 
3.4 Eliminating the influence of acquisition probability 
According to Song and Walkling (1999), the probability of becoming a target 
contribute to positive abnormal returns to the rival firms. Their research observes 
significant larger abnormal returns on rivals that became target of another merger 
event within one year after the original merger. Therefore, in order to eliminate the 
positive effect on abnormal returns earned by rivals due to future probability of 
becoming a target, I delete the rival firms that became a merger target within one year 
(12 months) after the original merger event. Therefore the degree of abnormal return 
on rival portfolio should be aroused by the increased cost-effectiveness created by the 
combination of two firms. 
A total number of 1726 mergers are left in the sample from 1990 to 2013, with 
994 horizontal mergers and 732 non-horizontal mergers. The distribution of all 




TABLE 1: descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for initial merger announcements. The merger announcements included in this sample are obtained from US mergers in SDC database, from January 1, 1990 to 
December 31, 2013. Although SDC reports announcements to the latest date, this paper only use data up to the end of 2013 as CRSP only reports data until the year of 2013. The number of rivals are the number of 
firms in the target’s industry except for target itself. Value of transaction is the value paid by acquirers of initial merger, and the data is collected from SDC. Successful mergers are identified by SDC as “completed” 
status, and unsuccessful mergers are identified by SDC as “withdrawn” status. Note that the withdrawn status in SDC could either be withdrawn or naturally expired. Horizontal mergers are the ones where acquirers are 
also in the same industry as the target, while non-horizontal mergers are the opposite. 
  
no of mergers 
  number of rivals   value of transaction(million) 
   mean median range  mean median max min 
all mergers 1726  236.23261 200 9-1870  2038.24 624.827 89167.72 3.2 
           
successful vs unsuccessful           
completed 1509  239.01818 209 9-1870  2060.1133 634.545 89167.72 3.2 
withdrawn 204  215.84912 77.5 9-1125  1962.3167 420 43711.6 7.939 
           
horizontal vs nonhorizontal           
horizontal 994  272.03197 226 9-1870  2263.4933 579.56 89167.72 3.2 





The first to fourth columns of table 1 counts the numbers of merger events in the 
sample, as well as calculating descriptive statistics for rival portfolio of each merger 
event. Most of the mergers are successful mergers, while withdrawn mergers consist 
only of a small portion. Besides, in each sample, the number of horizontal and non-
horizontal mergers are similar. The number of rival firms for each merger event varies 
from 9 to 1870, with an average and median of around 200 rival firms per merger. 
The industries with less than 10 firms, which provide the target with less than 9 rivals, 
are deleted from the sample. 
The fifth to ninth columns describe statistics on the value of transaction on each 
merger event. The data is extracted from SDC, recorded in million dollars. The value 
of transaction for each merger event varies from a small amount of 3.2 million to 





4.1 Constructing rival portfolio for target firm in each merger event 
For each merger event, the target is matched to a portfolio of rival firms in order 
to run group event study and cross sectional regression analysis. All other firms that 
have the same 3 digit SIC code as the target firm are identified as rivals. The rival 
portfolio is constructed with all other firms in the target firm’s industry, excluding 
itself. For each merger event, which is signified by a target identifier (PERMNO or 
CUSIP) and an event date, one corresponding rival portfolio is constructed. 
In order to take the size effect into consideration, the rival portfolios are constructed 
in both equal weighted and value weighted methods. In equal weighted portfolios, all 
rivals in the portfolio have same weighted regardless of their market value. The value 
weighted portfolios are weighted by the market value of each rival firm. The 
difference in CAR of value weighted portfolio and equal weighted portfolio indicate 
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that the size of rival firm contribute to difference in rival CAR at original target’s 
merger announcement. 
In order to further test the size effect of rival firms, I divide each rival portfolio 
into two parallel portfolios. One portfolio consists of rivals that are larger than (or 
equal to) the median market value of the industry, and the other portfolio consist of 
rivals that are smaller than the industry’s median firm size. Market value is calculated 
as number of common shares outstanding multiplied by average price over the year. 
Therefore, each merger event has two subsamples of rival portfolios: one with large 
rivals and one with small rivals. The rest of the paper will focus on their difference in 
CAR, and their relation to target CAR. 
 
4.2 Estimating rival and target CAR 
Firstly, I employ event study methodology to measure abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal returns of target firms and their rival firms during the period of a 
merger announcement. Using the daily return from Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), I estimate the daily abnormal returns for each target and rival firm 
from 30 days before merger announcement day and 30 days after the merger 
announcement day. I select 5 event windows: the period before announcement day [-
30, -2]; the period around the announcement day [-1, 1], the exact announcement day 
[0], one week after announcement [2, 7] and one month after announcement [2, 30]. 
Day -1, one day before announcement day, is included in the second window for 
estimation on announcement-period returns, because early information leaks are 
expected to affect the abnormal return. The estimation period starts from 300 days 
before the merger announcement date and ends at 46 days before announcement. 
During the estimation period, the parameters are estimated with market model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return to firm i or portfolio i at time t during the estimation period, 
and Rm is the value weighted CRSP index returns.  
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The abnormal return for each rival portfolio is the difference between real return on 
each day in the event window and the estimated return estimated according to the 
market model, which is computed as 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂? − ?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡. Then I aggregate the 
abnormal returns for each target firm as well as for each rival portfolio in all event 
windows to get the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which is computed as 
CAR=∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑖=1 , where T is the length of each event window. Table 2 reports the 
descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns of target firms and corresponding 
rival portfolios in the 5 selected event windows. If firm size is supposed to have an 
impact in the firm’s abnormal return, the CARs are expected to be different between 
equal weighted rival portfolios and value weighted rival portfolios. Therefore, a 






TABLE 2: target and rival portfolio CAR  
The CARs are the cumulative abnormal return which aggregates the daily abnormal returns in each event windows. The 
abnormal return is calculated with the market model. Although in event study I used 5 event windows, here I take only 3 event 
windows presenting the period before announcement, on announcement day, and after announcement. These three windows’ 
CAR are further used for cross sectional regressions later in the discussion. 
  (-30,-2)   (-1,1)   (2,30) 
  mean median stdev  mean median stdev  mean median stdev 
full sample(N=1729)            
target 0.0526  0.0332  0.1979   0.2186  0.1760  0.2580   -0.0050  -0.0071  0.1429  
equal weighted rivals 0.0035  -0.0001  0.0692   0.0020  0.0012  0.0167   0.0002  -0.0015  0.0761  
value weighted rivals -0.0020  -0.0016  0.0613   0.0012  0.0006  0.0189   -0.0041  -0.0034  0.0610  
paired t test 4.79***    2.01**    3.27***   
            
horizontal(N=994)            
target 0.0493  0.0410  0.2131   0.2376  0.1547  0.2379   -0.0026  0.0007  0.1992  
equal weighted rivals 0.0053  0.0006  0.0698   0.0018  0.0013  0.0156   0.0000  -0.0010  0.0763  
value weighted rivals -0.0023  -0.0028  0.0588   0.0008  0.0003  0.0174   -0.0043  -0.0039  0.0582  
paired t test 5.18***    2.38**    2.58**   
            
Non-
horizontal(N=732) 
           
target 0.0529  0.0457  0.1924   0.2468  0.1896  0.2107   -0.0015  -0.0039  0.1685  
equal weighted rivals 0.0013  -0.0009  0.0686   0.0022  0.0010  0.0182   0.0005  -0.0018  0.0760  
value weighted rivals -0.0018  -0.0002  0.0633   0.0017  0.0012  0.0208   -0.0040  -0.0020  0.0645  
paired t test 1.8*       1.03        2.37**     
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 
* denotes significance at 10% level. 
 
According to table 2, it is obvious that there is a significant difference between 
CARs calculated by equal weighted portfolio and value weighted portfolio in all 3 
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event windows during announcement period, as well as before and after 
announcement.  
In window (-1, 1), which includes one day before to one day after the merger 
announcement, the target and rivals have positive returns on average. However, the 
paired t test show a significant difference between equal weighted rival portfolios and 
value weighted rival portfolios for the horizontal mergers, while the rival portfolios 
for non-horizontal mergers don’t display any significance in the difference between 
equal weighted and value weighted. In the window before and after announcement, 
the difference between equal and value weight is significant. The mean and median 
abnormal return for targets are generally much larger than rival firms, indicating that 
targets are the most influenced among all firms in the industry on merger 
announcement. Moreover, on average, target firms have negative abnormal returns in 
the period after merger announcement.  
Then I substitute the full rival portfolio samples for the two subsamples of rival 
portfolios in order to calculate CARs for both big rival portfolios and small rival 





TABLE 3: CAR of larger and small rival portfolio 
This table presents descriptive statistics for both large and small rival portfolios. The large rival portfolio contains rival firms 
whose market size are bigger than industry median, and small rival portfolio consists of rivals whose size are smaller than 
industry median. The paired t test presents if there is a significant difference between large rival CAR and small rival CAR. 
  (-30,-2)  (-1,1)  (2,30) 
  mean median stdev  mean median stdev  mean median stdev 
full 
sample(N=1726) 
           
big -0.0007 -0.0015 0.0733  0.0025 0.0010 0.0219  -0.0036 -0.0037 0.0797 










            
horizontal(N=994)            
big -0.0033 -0.0050 0.0614  0.0031 0.0008 0.0173  -0.0018 -0.0007 0.0641 








            
Non-
horizontal(N=732) 
           
big -0.0023 -0.0027 0.0548  0.0030 0.0009 0.0208  -0.0019 -0.0031 0.0644 








*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 
* denotes significance at 10% level. 
 
Large rival portfolios shows an average of negative but insignificant CAR before 
and after the merger announcement, presented in the window (-30, -2) and (2, 30). In 
the period before announcement, small rival portfolios have on average positive but 
insignificant CARs. During window (-1,1) around takeover announcement, both large 
and small rival portfolios have positive cumulative abnormal returns. Moreover, 
according to the paired t test, there is significant difference between large rival CAR 
and small rival CAR, and the significance mostly comes from non-horizontal mergers, 
as the rivals of non-horizontal mergers show significant difference between large and 
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small rival CARs, while large and small rivals of horizontal mergers do not show 





5.1 Event study 
To analyze whether the target and rival obtain cumulative abnormal returns over 
selected periods around, before and after the merger announcement, I use event study 
to estimate daily abnormal return from 30 days before the merger announcement to 30 
days after the merger announcement. Then I aggregate daily abnormal returns in each 
event window to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns. The mean and median 





Table 4: event study 
Event study uses market model to estimate abnormal returns of both target and rival portfolio. The estimation period lasts for 225 
calendar days, from 300 days before announcement to 46 days before announcement. If the event date reported in SDC happens 
to fall on weekends or holidays, the return data automatically postpones to the next trading day. I select 5 event windows around 
the merger announcement: (-30,-2), (-1,1), (0), (2,7) and (2,30), among which day 0 is the announcement day. Later I use the 
CAR in (-1,1) to proxy for the announcement period in cross sectional studies because usually there are information leak before 
official announcement, and the market already starts to react a little before the day that the firm issues an official announcement. 
The test statistics below each CAR uses generalized sign z test, which tests whether the number of stocks or portfolios with 
positive CAR in the event window significantly exceeds the number of stocks of portfolios in the estimation window. The 




, where 𝜔 is the number of stock or portfolios with positive abnormal return in the event window, and ?̂? is the fraction of 
fraction of positive abnormal returns in the estimation window. 
 
    (-30,-2) (-1,1) 0 (2,7) (2,30) 
panel A: full sample (N=1726)      
target median 0.0332 0.176 0.0809 -0.0028 -0.007 
 mean 0.0526*** 0.2186*** 0.1468*** *-0.0021 -0.005 
 test stat of mean 14.71  40.676 30.396 -1.442 -0.822 
rival median -0.000113 0.0012118 0.0004545 2.929E-05 -0.001458 
 mean *-0.0038 0.0013* 0.0008 ***-0.0011 -0.0022 
 test stat of mean -1.47  1.585 0.872 -2.379 0.356 
large vs small (N=1726)      
large rivals median -0.0015 0.002 0.0059 -0.001 -0.0037 
 mean ***-0.0007 0.0025*** 0.0016** ***-0.0003 ***-0.0036 
 test stat of mean -2.566 2.668 1.835 -3.835 -4.509 
small rivals median -0.0014 0.0009 0.0001 -0.001 -0.0033 
 mean 0.0019*** 0.0013 0.0006 0*** ***-0.002 






    (-30,-2) (-1,1) 0 (2,7) (2,30) 
panel B: successful vs unsuccessful     
successful (N=1509)      
target median 0.0357 0.1985 0.0935 -0.0024 -0.0043 
 mean 0.0522*** 0.2457*** 0.1649*** *-0.0019 -0.0007 
 test stat of mean 11.809 32.376 24.18 -1.335 0.211 
rival median -4.19E-05 0.0016 0.0006 1.409E-05 -0.0008 
 mean 0.0039*** 0.0028*** 0.0014** 0.0008*** 0.0012*** 
 test stat of mean -2.483 2.809 1.742 -2.355 -2.867 
unsuccessful (N=204)      
target median 0.0304 0.1742 0.0574 -0.0009 -0.0123 
 mean 0.0449*** 0.2148*** 0.1341*** 0.0029 -0.0146 
 test stat of mean 3.229 10.94 7.575 0.425 -0.977 
rival median -0.0001 0.0014 0.0015 0.0019 0.0038 
 mean 0.0116 0.0064 0.0035** 0.0021 0.0058 
 test stat of mean -0.621 0.028 2.302 -0.296 0.028 
       
panel C: horizontal vs nonhorizontal     
horizontal (N=994)      
target median 0.0282 0.1897 0.0816 -0.0014 -0.0042 
 mean 0.0493*** 0.2376*** 0.1574*** -0.0014 -0.0026 
 test stat of mean 8.45 25.409 19.438 -0.095 0.159 
rival median -0.0027 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0038 
 mean **-0.0023 0.0008 0.0003 ***-0.0007 ***-0.0043 
 test stat of mean -2.159 0.655 0.709 -2.849 -2.796 
non-horizontal (N=732)      
target median 0.0419 0.2058 0.0940 -0.0026 -0.0069 
 mean 5.29*** 24.68*** 16.52*** *-0.0012 -0.0015 
 test stat of mean 8.801 22.935 16.201 -1.559 -0.449 
rival median -0.0002 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0019 
 mean -0.0018 0.0017** 0.0007 ***-0.0017 **-0.004 
  test stat of mean -0.705 1.916 -0.586 ***-2.552 -1.659 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 





Previous findings have proved takeover targets gain positive return on 
announcement day of the takeover. Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that takeovers 
generate positive gains and target firm shareholders should benefit. My results are 
consistent with previous findings that target firms gain positive and significant 
cumulative abnormal returns during announcement period of the initial merger as 
expected. On announcement denoted in event window (0), target CAR are 
significantly positive. The event window (-1,1) also have positive and significant 
abnormal returns, which allows for some information leak one trading day before the 
announcement day, and some reactions one day after the announcement day. 
Moreover, Target CAR during the run-up period also show a very significantly 
positive pattern. This run-up trend before announcement day has been discovered and 
explained in other studies. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find that illegal insider trading 
positively related to price run-up prior to announcement. In the period after 
announcement, target CAR are negative and significant in event window (2,7), but 
becomes insignificant in a longer period (2,30). Schwert (1996) finds that the post 
announcement period returns are unrelated to pre-announcement stock price run-ups.  
Panel A shows results for full sample event study. For full sample of rival 
portfolios, there is significant positive returns on announcement period, consistent 
with the finding of Eckbo (1983) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996). During the event 
window (-1,1), rival portfolios earn on average a positive and significant return of 
0.0013, while on event day (0), rivals gain 0.0008 return, but not significant. Before 
announcement, rivals have positive and significant abnormal returns, and slightly 
negative abnormal returns in the period following announcement, similar to target 
sample. 
Then I split the rival portfolio into large rival portfolio consisting of only large 
rivals bigger than industry median and small rival portfolio containing rivals smaller 
than industry median size, and conduct the event study on the two portfolios 
separately. It is obvious that large rivals earn significantly positive abnormal returns 
on announcement periods, both during (-1,1) and (0) event window. On the contrary, 
small rivals don’t show significant abnormal returns during announcement period. 
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Large rivals have negative returns before and after announcement, while small rivals 
have positive returns before announcement and negative returns after announcement.  
    Panel B divides the full sample of all mergers into successful mergers and 
unsuccessful mergers. The results show that whether a merger is successful or not 
does not make significant influence on the abnormal return of rival firms. The rival 
firms in both successful mergers and unsuccessful mergers acquire positive and 
significant CAR on merger announcement day. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Paul (1982), who find that the market makes no distinction between 
successful and unsuccessful mergers on the day of the merger announcement. Rather, 
the market predicts whether a merger announcement will succeed or will be cancelled 
in a short period after the announcement. Consistent with the finding, the successful 
mergers in my sample have significantly positive abnormal returns in all event 
windows, while withdrawn rivals are only significant on announcement day. It 
indicates that as the market distinguishes successful and unsuccessful mergers in the 
period after announcement, rivals of successful mergers gain more significant 
abnormal return than rivals of unsuccessful mergers. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the sample of unsuccessful mergers is relatively small, as there are only 204 
withdrawn mergers, either naturally expired or cancelled, compared to 1509 
successful mergers. Therefore, the sample of unsuccessful merger does not have as 
the explanatory power as the successful sample of mergers. 
The subsamples in Panel C distinguishes the abnormal returns between 
horizontal mergers and non-horizontal mergers. According to the results, rivals in 
horizontal mergers have positive but insignificant CAR of 0.0008 on announcement 
period of (-1,1), while the rival CAR of non-horizontal mergers are significantly 
positive of 0.0017. This is consistent with the hypothesis that non-horizontal rivals are 
expected to benefit more from initial target takeover announcement, as innovations 
are brought in from outside the industry. Horizontal rivals have significant positive 
return during the run-up period and negative returns after announcement, while non-




In general, the results are consistent with previous findings that rival firms gain 
abnormal returns on announcement day of original merger. In addition, the results 
indicate that rivals of non-horizontal mergers seem to enjoy more significant positive 
abnormal returns around the day of announcement, and big rivals have significantly 
more positive CAR than small rivals. The results are consistent with the hypothesis. 
 
5.2 Cross sectional regression 
To further analyze the relation between the abnormal return of rival firms and 
other factors, I employ the cross sectional regressions to detect the factors that may 
contribute to rival abnormal return, especially target abnormal returns. The regression 
reveals how rival CARs are related to target CARs, as well as other control variables, 
grouped into firm-specific variables, industry specific variables and merger-specific 
variables. Firm-specific variables include relative firm size of rival to target, and 
leverage and Tobin’s Q of both target firm and rival portfolio. The relative size of 
target firm and rival firm is calculated as: 
Relative size = average market value of rival portfolio/market value of target 
Which adjusts for the size of rival firms. Since the sample contains only major 
mergers in the industry, the target firm sizes are larger than the industry median size. 
If the average market value of rival portfolio is larger than the target size, the relative 
size variable is larger than 1; else the value of this variable is smaller than 1.  
Both target and rival firms’ leverage are computed as the firm’s asset divided by 
equity. Tobin’s Q is calculated as: 
Tobin’s Q = (share price * common shares outstanding + liability)/asset 
Where share price uses the year end price collected from Compustat, and the number 
of shares outstanding, as well as total liability and total asset are also from Compustat. 
The Tobin’s Q variable proxies for the firm’s performance. 








where Sn is the market share of the ith firm, and the market share is computed as the 
ith firm’s market value divided by aggregated market value of all the firms in that 
industry. The industry includes all firms with the same 3 digit SIC code as the ith 
firm, using the same criteria as the previous method when identifying industry rivals. 
The Herfindahl Hirschman index adjusts for the influence of industry concentration. 
Merger-specific variables are transaction value and horizontal dummy. 
Transaction value takes the log value of the merger transaction. multibidder dummy is 
a dummy variable identifying whether the merger has only one acquirer or more than 
one bidder. If there is only one acquirer, the dummy variable equals 0. On the 
contrary, if there are more than one acquirer bidding the target, the dummy variable 
equals 1. The cross sectional regressions are firstly conducted on full rival samples, 
which are rival portfolios without distinguishing large and small rivals. Table 5 





Table 5: cross sectional regression 
This table presents results of cross sectional regression. The dependent variable is the CAR of rival portfolios, and main 
independent variable is the corresponding target CAR. I also include the relative size variable which is calculated as rival market 
size over target market size. I also include Tobin’s Q and leverage of both target and rival firms as control variable to control for 
firm specific characteristics. I use HHI index to adjust for industry concentration, and I also add characteristics of initial merger, 
which include initial transaction value and a dummy variable indicating whether the original merger has more than one bidders. 
 
Panel A: full sample 
  full sample 
  (-30,-2) (-1,1) (2,30) 
Intercept 0.01575*** 0.00188 0.00666 
 3.4 1.54 1.23 
targetCAR 0.03273*** 0.00553*** 0.02375** 
 4.69 4.18 2.2 
sizeR/T 2.9E-06 -1.23E-06 -7.1E-06 
 0.65 -1.07 -1.35 
Target TobinQ 0.00114* 0.000117 0.00196*** 
 1.87 0.74 2.73 
Target Leverage -0.00024 2.57E-05 -0.00028 
 -1.19 0.49 -1.14 
Rival TobinQ 0.000234 *-0.00009419 **-0.00051839 
 1.14 -1.78 -2.15 
Rival Leverage -1.3E-05 0.00003253* -7.9E-06 
 -0.2 1.96 -0.1 
Herfindahl Index 6.91E-07 -6.88E-08 -9.1E-07 
 0.75 -0.29 -0.84 
Transaction Value ***-0.00096 -8.24E-05 -0.00027 
 -4.18 -1.39 -1 
Multibidder Dummy 0.00102 0.00222 -0.00182 
 0.18 1.52 -0.27 
R square 0.0322 0.0167 0.0125 
N 1726 1726 1726 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 





Panel B: horizontal and non-horizontal subsamples 
  horizontal non-horizontal 
  (-30,-2) (-1,1) (2,30) (-30,-2) (-1,1) (2,30) 
Intercept 0.02327*** -0.00732 -0.00687 0.01657** 0.00188 0.02517*** 
 3.29 -1.5 -0.85 2.33 0.88 2.94 
targetCAR 0.03732*** 0.00742* 0.05815*** 0.02302** 0.00954*** -0.01736 
 4.16 1.95 4.05 2.07 4.24 -1.06 
sizeR/T -0.00014 -7.2E-05 5.88E-05 3.18E-06 -1.13E-06 -7.4E-06 
 -0.87 -0.47 0.31 0.73 -0.9 -1.41 
Target TobinQ 0.0027*** -1E-05 0.00386*** *-0.00174 3.51E-05 -0.0005 
 3.35 -0.04 4.09 -1.79 0.12 -0.42 
Target Leverage -0.00165 *-0.0005086 0.000276 -0.00019 4.13E-05 -0.00019 
 -1.51 -1.67 0.22 -0.92 0.7 -0.75 
Rival TobinQ -0.00077 9.11E-06 -0.00076 0.000324 -6.7E-05 **-0.0005289 
 -1.23 0.03 -1.04 1.54 -1.09 -2.08 
Rival Leverage -0.00012 -3.04E-06 2.89E-05 2.51E-05 0.00004894** -2.1E-05 
 -0.99 -0.08 0.2 0.34 2.29 -0.23 
Herfindahl Index -1.1E-06 -5.8E-07 -1.7E-06 0.00000225** 6.7E-08 -1E-06 
 -0.74 -0.97 -1.01 1.9 0.2 -0.73 
Transaction Value ***-0.00107 0.00155** 0.000382 ***-0.00102 *-0.00018897 **-0.00107 
 -3.22 2.41 0.99 -2.96 -1.88 -2.56 
Multibidder Dummy -0.00385 -0.00093 -0.0066 0.00864 0.00264 0.00565 
 -0.53 -0.26 -0.78 0.97 1.02 0.52 
R square 0.0551 0.0424 0.0299 0.0332 0.0356 0.0199 
N 994 994 994 732 732 732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 
* denotes significance at 10% level. 
 
In window (-1,1), rival CARs are positively and significantly related to target 
CARs. The results strongly support the previous assumption that rival firms in the 
same industry experience significant abnormal returns on the announcement of a 
target’s merger announcement, as rivals follow target firms to acquirer abnormal 
returns. Moreover, rival CARs are also significantly related to target CARs during 
event window (-1,1) for both horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, and the 
estimated parameter of target CAR in non-horizontal mergers is larger than the 
parameter of target CAR in horizontal mergers. This indicates higher rival CAR 
prediction in non-horizontal mergers than in non-horizontal mergers. 
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The main variable, target CAR, in the (-30, -2) period before target 
announcement is positive and significant for both horizontal and non-horizontal 
mergers. According to event study results, target firms have significant and positive 
returns before merger announcement, and the cross-sectional results show that rivals 
also have a run-up period before the merger announcement. According to Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989), insider trading pull up the target price before announcement, and 
Jegadeesh, Yang (2011) also argue that insider information leakage also leads to a 
price run-up prior to announcement day. Here the positive and significant relation 
between rival CAR and target CAR during the pre-announcement period indicate that 
the market also put expectation on rival firms before takeover announcement once 
there appears certain information leak or insider trading on market that drives up 
target return before announcement.  
During the (2,30) period after announcement, the target CAR of horizontal 
mergers are significantly and positively related to target CAR, which means that 
rivals of horizontal mergers follow the trend of target firm performance, while rivals 
of non-horizontal mergers do not follow targets’ trend. From the previous event study 
results, target firms have negative but insignificant abnormal returns in the period 
after merger announcement. Horizontal mergers have significantly negative returns in 
that period, while non-horizontal mergers present insignificantly negative results. 
In terms of control variables, target firm Tobin’s Q significantly affect rival CAR 
in horizontal mergers before and after the announcement of original merger. Tobin’s 
Q of rival firms also affect rival CAR in the period after merger. As Tobin’s Q is a 
proxy for firm performance, it shows that rival abnormal return follow target firm 
performance, and are closely related to rivals’ own performance after merger, as well 
as the run-up period. In addition, for horizontal mergers, rival CAR is negatively and 
significantly related to transaction value in the period before announcement, and also 
negatively and significantly related to on announcement day, indicating that rivals 
gain bigger CAR on announcement when the acquirer of the initial merger pays less 
amount to the target. For non-horizontal mergers, transaction value is negative and 
significant during all periods before and after merger announcement. This is 
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consistent with the finding of Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar and Travlos (2011) that 
overpayment destroy value for acquiring firms. 
In general, the results show that rival firms are positively and significantly 
influenced by target CAR during merger announcement. Moreover, rival CARs are 
affected by target in the periods before and after the announcement. This result is 
consistent with previous studies that rivals gain abnormal returns on target merger 
announcement. It also proves that market have expectations on rival firms in the 
period before merger announcement when targets have a run-up. Moreover, rival 
return are related to target return and performance after merger announcement. 
 
5.3 Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) of large and small rivals 
The previous regression on full rival sample provide evidence supporting that 
rivals are affected by target return and gain abnormal returns on original target’s 
merger announcement, as well as before and after announcement. According to the 
hypothesis, larger rival firms should benefit more from the market efficiency created 
from the original merger rather than small rival firms. If the hypothesis holds, the 
rival portfolio that only contain rival firms that are larger than industry median size 
should react more actively than the portfolio that only contain rivals smaller than 
industry median. Therefore, I conduct regressions on both large rival and small rival. 
CAR of large rival portfolio and small rival portfolio are separately regressed on 
target CAR, and other control variables which are the same as previous regression: 
relative size of rival and target, rival and target leverage and Tobin’s Q, industry HHI, 
transaction value of merger, and a multi bidder dummy variable. 
As the large rival portfolio and small rival portfolio are derived from the same 
rival sample, and are matched to the same target sample, they are both supposed to be 
related to target CAR. Both large rival portfolio and small rival portfolio share the 
same independent variable target CAR, and the errors of the paired regressions are 
assumed to be contemporaneously interrelated. Therefore, assuming the interrelation 
between the paired models, I employ the seemingly unrelated regression instead of 
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ordinary least squares to regress large and small rival portfolio CAR on target CAR 
and other control variables at the same time.  
The paired models for seemingly unrelated regressions are as follows: 
Large rival CAR = target CAR + firm specific variables + industry specific variables 
+ merger specific variables; 
Small rival CAR = target CAR + firm specific variables + industry specific variables 
+ merger specific variables; 
Where the firm specific variables are rival to target firm relative size, rival firm and 
target firm leverage, rival firm and target firm’s Tobin’s Q; industry specific variable 
is the industry’s Herfindahl index; and merger specific variables are the log value of 
transaction and a dummy variable indicating whether there are more than one bidders 
in the merger.  






TABLE 6: cross model correlation matrix of seemingly unrelated regressions 
This table presents the cross model correlation between large and small rival CAR in seemingly unrelated regressions. The 
seemingly unrelated regressions model large or small rival CAR on target CAR. As both large rival portfolio and small rival 
portfolio share the same independent variable target CAR, the errors of the large and small rival CAR regressions are assumed to 
be contemporaneously interrelated. The correlation matrix presents the correlations between the paired models of large and small 
CAR as dependent variable. In the table, t stats of cross model correlation is calculated as t = r/𝑠𝑟 . r is the correlation of large 
rival CAR and small rival CAR given in the table, and 𝑠𝑟 is the standard deviation where 𝑠𝑟 = √
1−𝑟2
𝑛−2
 . n is the sample size of 
each regression. 
 
  (-30,-2)   (-1,1)   (2,30) 
full sample (N=1726)     
correlation 0.1909***  0.18547***  0.21937*** 
t stat 8.0749  7.8369  9.3359 
      
horizontal (N=994)     
correlation 0.21886***  0.16491***  0.28299*** 
t stat 7.0645  5.2661  9.2929 
      
non-horizontal (N=732)     
correlation 0.15925***  0.19772***  0.14007*** 
t stat 4.3583   5.4497   3.8222 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 
* denotes significance at 10% level. 
 
According to t tests, all correlations in the table are significantly large, indicating 
a strong correlation between the dependent variables of seemingly unrelated 
regressions because the interrelated large and small rival CARs are affected by the 
same independent variable. In the full merger sample, the cross model correlation 
between large and small rival CAR is 0.19 for window (-20,-2), 0.19 for window (-
1,1), and 0.22 for window (2,30). The correlation between large and small rivals of 
horizontal mergers vary from 0.16 in window (-1,1), 0.22 in window (-30,-2) and up 
to 0.28 in window (2,30). The correlation between large and small rivals of non-
horizontal mergers show similar patterns, but are slightly lower, as the cross-model 
correlations are 0.16 in (-30, -2), 0.20 in (-1,1) and 0.14 in (2,30). The results indicate 
a correlation between large and small rival CAR, the dependent variables of the 
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models. Therefore, a seemingly unrelated regression is needed to adjust for the 
interrelation between the paired models. 
The results of seemingly unrelated regressions are presented in the following 
table: 
 
TABLE 7: seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
Following the previous regression results, the seemingly unrelated regression further tests the relation between rival CAR and 
target CAR. As large rival portfolio and small rival portfolio share the same independent variable in the regression, the seemingly 
unrelated regression is used to deal with the interrelation. The independent variables are CAR of larger rival portfolio and CAR 
of small rival portfolio. The main independent variable remains target CAR. I also include the relative size variable which is 
calculated as rival market size over target market size, while the rival size is either the average size of large rival portfolio or 
small rival portfolio. Other control variables concerning the rival firms are also calculated according to large rival sample or 
small rival sample instead of full sample. I also include Tobin’s Q and leverage of both target and rival firms as control variable 
to control for firm specific characteristics. I use HHI index to adjust for industry concentration, and I also add characteristics of 
initial merger, which includes initial transaction value and a dummy variable indicating whether the original merger has more 





Panel A: CAR in event window (-1,1) 
  all mergers   horizontal mergers   Non-horizontal mergers 
  big   small  big  small  big  small 
intercept 0.005058*** 0.000616  0.005961** 0.001919  0.00378  0.001724 
 3.2  0.38  2.53  0.81  1.35  0.59 
targetCAR 0.010209*** 0.002506  0.005033** 0.000508  0.018119*** 0.004999* 
 6.24  1.49  2.56  0.26  6.44  1.7 
sizeR/T -1.1E-07  -3.8E-06  -6.8E-06  -0.00027  -7.8E-08  -3.5E-06 
 -0.28  -0.53  -0.72  -1.59  -0.19  -0.45 
Target TobinQ 0.000082  0.000116  0.000224  0.000239  -0.00005  -0.00036 
 0.48  0.66  1.16  1.22  -0.14  -0.94 
Target Leverage -0.00007  0.000162** 0.000227  -0.00045  -0.00008  0.000174** 
 -1.14  2.41  0.53  -1.04  -1.12  2.33 
Rival TobinQ -0.00001  -2.2E-07  -0.00023  -0.00017  -2.2E-06  3.95E-06 
 -0.2  0  -0.88  -0.64  -0.03  0.05 
Rival Leverage 0.000037  -6.6E-06  0.000037  -7.4E-06  0.000082  -0.00008 
 1.41  -0.25  1.53  -0.3  0.38  -0.35 
Herfindahl Index 5.65E-07  1.33E-07  3.07E-07  5.33E-07  7.48E-07  9.6E-08 
 1.57  0.36  0.52  0.89  1.51  0.19 
Transaction Value -0.00035*** -1.5E-06  -0.00029*** -4.1E-08  -0.0004***  -0.00009 
 -4.58  -0.02  -2.83  0  -3.17  -0.67 
Multibidder Dummy 0.002717  0.002178  0.00381  0.00241  0.001132  0.002051 
 1.43  1.12  1.61  1.01  0.36  0.63 
R square 0.0237  0.0183  0.0439 
N 1726  994  732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 






Panel B: CAR in event window (-30, -2) 
  all mergers  horizontal mergers  Non-horizontal mergers 
  big  small  big  small  big  small 
intercept 0.002884  0.016402*** 0.016508** 0.016072*  -0.00425  0.012573 
 0.59  3.03  2.01  1.85  -0.58  1.43 
targetCAR 0.060795*** 0.032111*** 0.054921*** 0.036124*** 0.066505*** 0.02384* 
 8.52  4.04  5.76  3.59  6.12  1.83 
sizeR/T -8.4E-08  0.00003  1.26E-06  0.000383  -2.8E-08  0.000031 
 -0.07  1.22  0.04  0.63  -0.02  1.25 
Target TobinQ -0.00055  0.001441** -0.00034  0.002077*** -0.0018*  -0.0001 
 -1.03  2.42  -0.5  2.89  -1.83  -0.08 
Target Leverage 0.000216  -0.00022  -0.00304** 0.001693  0.000263  -0.00027 
 1.06  -0.97  -2.02  1.06  1.35  -1.14 
Rival TobinQ -0.00031  0.000348  -0.00011  0.000229  -0.00034  0.000365 
 -1.44  1.44  -0.12  0.24  -1.62  1.44 
Rival Leverage -0.00003  -0.00005  -0.00002  -0.00005  -0.00008  -0.00026 
 -0.36  -0.51  -0.27  -0.59  -0.15  -0.38 
Herfindahl Index -3.2E-07  1.26E-06  -0.00000411** 3.06E-06  1.72E-06  1.25E-06 
 -0.28  1.01  -2  1.41  1.28  0.78 
Transaction Value -0.00042*  -0.00085*** -0.00101*** -0.00089** -0.00003  -0.00063 
 -1.77  -3.23  -2.79  -2.32  -0.07  -1.53 
Multibidder Dummy 0.003261  0.000898  0.004227  -0.00393  0.004321  0.006444 
 0.55  0.14  0.51  -0.45  0.51  0.64 
R square 0.0373  0.0471  0.0445 
N 1726  994  732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 






Panel C: CAR in event window (2,30) 
  all mergers  horizontal mergers  Non-horizontal mergers 
  big  small  big  small  big  small 
intercept 0.010157  0.04748*** 0.000239  0.027578*** 0.001303  0.022419** 
 1.21  4.42  0.05  4.33  0.16  2.27 
targetCAR 0.105286*** -0.00288  0.130947*** 0.016379  0.152128*** 0.035581** 
 6.69  -0.14  13.33  1.33  12.03  2.31 
sizeR/T 4.7E-07  -0.00002  4.67E-07  -0.00001  -1.3E-06  0.000632 
 0.36  -0.58  0.37  -0.47  -0.04  0.91 
Target TobinQ -0.00136  -0.00192  0.000445  0.002759*** 0.001369** 0.004791*** 
 -1.21  -1.33  0.78  3.88  2.02  5.78 
Target Leverage 0.000105  -0.00038  0.000016  -0.00043  -0.00144  0.000531 
 0.47  -1.31  0.07  -1.57  -0.97  0.29 
Rival TobinQ -0.00027  -0.00072** -0.00031  -0.00073** -0.00121  -0.0016 
 -1.1  -2.31  -1.36  -2.54  -1.33  -1.45 
Rival Leverage 0.000412  -0.00145*  0.000074  -0.00011  0.000072  -0.00008 
 0.62  -1.7  0.86  -1.03  0.85  -0.81 
Herfindahl Index 1.12E-06  -0.00000327* -8.1E-08  -0.0000031** -2.9E-06  -0.00000536** 
 0.72  -1.65  -0.07  -2.09  -1.44  -2.15 
Transaction Value -0.00075*  -0.00137*** -0.00012  -0.00103*** 0.000092  -0.00085* 
 -1.9  -2.72  -0.49  -3.29  0.26  -1.94 
Multibidder Dummy -0.00014  0.00042  -0.00633  -0.00263  -0.01203  -0.00741 
 -0.01  0.03  -1.01  -0.34  -1.45  -0.73 
R square 0.0504  0.0676  0.1012 
N 1726  994  732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 
* denotes significance at 10% level. 
 
 
The panel A presents regression during the (-1, 1) event window. According to 
the table, large firm CARs are positively and significantly related to target CAR, 
while small firm CAR is not significant during the announcement period and after. It 
strongly supports the hypothesis that large rivals earn positive and significant returns 
on target announcement day, while small rivals do not benefit from the merger 
announcement as much as the large rivals. In addition, it should also be noted that the 
transaction value of the original merger is negatively and significantly related to rival 
CAR, which means rivals are expected to benefit more and have higher returns when 
the transaction value of initial merger is lower, and market expectation on rival firms 
decrease when the original takeover payment is higher. According to Alexandridis, 
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Fuller, Terhaar and Travlos (2011), large acquisitions destroy more value for 
shareholders than small acquisitions due to overpayment or overconfidence. The 
overpayment on initial takeover target could also negatively affect market’s 
expectation on the target’s horizontal rivals. In addition, another part of the hypothesis 
assumes that rivals of non-horizontal mergers would gain higher returns than rivals of 
horizontal mergers as the market expect rival firms in the target’s industry take 
advantage of the increased market power brought in by non-horizontal mergers. The 
results of seemingly unrelated regression also present some difference between 
horizontal mergers and non-horizontal mergers to support the hypothesis. Small rivals 
of non-horizontal mergers react more actively during the (-1,1) announcement period. 
And the parameter estimation of non-horizontal rivals are larger than parameters of 
horizontal rivals, so that for the same unit of target CAR, the estimated non-horizontal 
rival CAR are larger in scale than horizontal rival CAR. 
Panel B presents results in the periods before announcement. During the event 
window (-30, -2), results show that both large and small rival CAR are also 
significantly and positively related to target CAR before the announcement. 
Therefore, large rivals and small rivals are both positively affected by target firms’ 
run-up period before merger announcement day, as discussed in the full sample cross 
sectional regressions. Similar to previous cross sectional regression results, HHI 
shows some negative relation to rival CAR, indicating that rivals gain higher returns 
when the industry is less concentrated. For small rivals of horizontal merger, the 
control variable target Tobin’s Q is positively and significantly related to rival 
abnormal return, which means when target have better performances, the market 
expect small rivals to receive higher return. There appears to be no big difference 
between horizontal and non-horizontal rivals in the pre-announcement period, as both 
horizontal and non-horizontal rival CARs are significantly related to target CAR. 
Panel C presents results in the period (2, 30) after initial merger announcement. 
CAR of large rivals of both horizontal and non-horizontal mergers are positively and 
significantly related to target CAR. As target firms have slightly negative CAR during 
the period after announcement according to event study results, the large rivals are 
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also supposed to have negative CAR in this period. Small rival CAR of non-
horizontal mergers are significantly and positively related to target CAR, while rivals 
of horizontal mergers do not show any significance.  
In general, the results of seemingly unrelated regressions support the hypothesis, 
in that larger rival firms benefit more from a merger announcement in the industry. 
Furthermore, rivals of non-horizontal merger targets acquirer higher returns than 
rivals of horizontal mergers, therefore it could be that market have higher expectation 
on market power brought in by non-horizontal mergers, as the hypothesis posits. 
 
 
6 Robustness test 
 
The seemingly unrelated regressions model both large rival portfolio CAR and 
small rival portfolio CAR on target CAR. However, both large rival abnormal return 
and small rival abnormal return are estimated using market model. In that case, there 
are chances that the positive significant relation between the dependent variable and 
the main independent variable is derived from the same factor in both models, rather 
than its intrinsic significance. As presented in the tables above, large rival portfolio 
CAR is significantly related to target CAR, but this significance may also be created 
by the fact that both rival and target CAR are estimated by the same market model 
using simultaneous market return, as both the rival and target react to the same event, 
which uses exactly the same announcement day.  
Therefore, I include market factors which are mutually used in estimating both 
target and rival abnormal return into the regression model. The market factors are 
derived from CAPM, 
E(𝑅𝑖) − R𝑓 = 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − R𝑓) 
Where 𝛽𝑖 is the sensitivity of firm’s abnormal return in excess to the market’s 







And E(𝑅𝑖) is the expected return of a firm, R𝑓 is the risk free rate, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑚) 
is the expected return on the market. 
Based on the market beta in CAPM, the first market factor added to the 
regression is a product of the two market betas in the model for estimating target CAR 
and rival CAR. I reproduce this variable for both large rival portfolio and small rival 
portfolio: 
Market factor 1(for large rival regression) = 𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙; 
Market factor 1(for small rival regression) = 𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙. 
Target betas and rival betas are the parameters of market return variable in the market 
model estimating target and rival abnormal returns in event study.  
To strengthen the test, I substitute the first set of market beta variable with 
another kind of market beta variable, multiplying target market beta, big or small rival 
portfolio’s market beta, and the variance of market beta. In event study, I use the 
market model for both target firms and rival firms to estimate the parameter of each 
market factor with estimation period data: 
𝑅𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑚 + 𝜀𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑚 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 
Where the 𝑅𝑚 is the CRSP value weighted return on market portfolio. Because 
target and rivals share the same event day, the Rm in both equations are supposed to 
be the same market return on the same period. 


























2 is the variance of market return, the 𝜎𝑅𝑚
2 in the two equations above 
should be the same, and I used an F test to prove their equality. 
Therefore, the second kind of market factor is calculated as: 
Market factor 2(for large rival regression) = 𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙  × 𝜎𝑅𝑚
2; 
Market factor 2(for small rival regression) = 𝛽𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙  × 𝜎𝑅𝑚
2. 
After including the common market factor into the regression, if the parameter 
estimation of target CAR, the main variable, is still significant, the previous results of 
seemingly unrelated regressions that large rival firms earn abnormal returns on target 
firms’ merger announcements are supported. Nevertheless, if the previous 
significance of main variable is diminished while the market factor becomes 
significant instead, it proves that the significant relations between rival CAR and 
target CAR are actually created by common market factors, not because of they are 
related by themselves. The results of this robustness test is presented in the following 
table: 
 
TABLE 8: cross sectional regression with market factor 
This table presents the results of regressions with common market factor, in order to test whether the significant relation between rival 
CAR and target CAR is aroused by the common market factor because they are estimated over the same announcement period using same 
market return. Similar to the cross sectional regression in the previous section, the dependent variable is the CAR of rival portfolios, and 
main independent variable is the corresponding target CAR. I also include the relative size variable which is calculated as rival market 
size over target market size. I also include Tobin’s Q and leverage of both target and rival firms as control variable to control for firm 
specific characteristics. I use HHI index to adjust for industry concentration, and I also added characteristics of initial merger, which 
includes initial transaction value and a dummy variable indicating whether the original merger has more than one bidders. Apart from 
these control variables, I add two kinds of market factors into the regression to test their influence. If the main variable target CAR is still 
positive and significant, it means that the significant relation presented in the cross sectional regression and seemingly unrelated 
regression is indeed their intrinsic relation, not created by the market factor in estimating target and rival abnormal return. However, if the 
market factor variable becomes significant while main variable target CAR becomes insignificant, it indicates that the previous positive 






Panel A: (-1,1) full sample 
  full sample 
  big small 
Intercept 0.00611*** 0.00602*** -0.00095 -0.00054 
 3.48 3.67 -0.54 -0.33 
targetCAR 0.01032*** 0.01033*** 0.00261 0.00261 
 6.17 6.17 1.53 1.53 
sizeR/T -1.16E-07 -1.18E-07 -3.4E-06 -3.4E-06 
 -0.3 -0.31 -0.47 -0.47 
common market factor(1) -0.00012  0.000279  
 -0.25  0.51  
common market factor(2)  0.211  0.20189 
  0.51  0.42 
Target TobinQ -4.1E-05 -5.68E-05 7.04E-05 8.01E-05 
 -0.2 -0.29 0.34 0.39 
Target Leverage -8E-05 -7.92E-05 0.000159 0.00015848** 
 -1.21 -1.21 2.38 2.37 
Rival TobinQ -2.2E-05 -2.33E-05 0.00023695*** 0.00023883*** 
 -0.31 -0.33 2.71 2.76 
Rival Leverage 3.69E-05 3.77E-05 -7.2E-05 -7.6E-05 
 1.41 1.44 -1.15 -1.21 
Herfindahl Index 4.64E-07 4.41E-07 4.36E-07 4.29E-07 
 1.27 1.21 1.22 1.2 
Transaction Value 1.6E-05 4.71E-06 ***-0.00038883 ***-0.00038998 
 0.2 0.06 -4.92 -4.96 
Multibidder Dummy 0.00232 0.00223 0.00128 0.00115 
 1.21 1.16 0.66 0.58 
R square 0.043 0.0432 0.0129 0.0127 
N 1726 1726 1726 1726 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 






Panel B: (-1,1) horizontal and non-horizontal mergers 
  horizontal non-horizontal 





-0.00067 -0.00039 0.00467 0.00434 0.000771 0.00108 










 2.47 2.47 0.51 0.51 6.45 6.48 1.52 1.53 





 -0.79 -0.78 -1.36 -1.33 -0.19 -0.2 -0.39 -0.4 
common market 
factor(1) 
-2.2E-05  0.000249  -0.00036  -6.7E-05  
 -0.04  0.4  -0.42  -0.07  
common market 
factor(2) 
 -0.60806  -1.54123*  0.48615  0.73017 
  -0.7  -1.65  0.97  1.19 





 0.08 0.16 1.15 1.41 0.06 0.02 -1.1 -1.16 




 0.01 0.03 -0.78 -0.78 -1.16 -1.14 2.33 2.34 
Rival TobinQ -0.00025 -0.00024 0.00023099** 0.00026106*** -6.7E-06 -1E-05 0.000204 0.000165 
 -0.93 -0.92 2.49 2.86 -0.09 -0.13 1.07 0.86 





 1.48 1.47 -1.13 -1.27 0.66 0.81 -0.58 -0.76 









 0.37 0.38 1.66 1.68 1.27 1.13 0.6 0.47 






 0.33 0.38 -3.13 -3.04 -0.56 -0.65 -3.49 -3.54 
Multibidder Dummy 0.00273 0.0027 0.00139 0.00131 0.00161 0.00114 0.000988 0.000234 
 1.14 1.13 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.36 0.3 0.07 
R square 0.0255 0.0261 0.0205 0.0234 0.0798 0.0811 0.0163 0.0183 
N 994 994 994 994 732 732 732 732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 





Panel C: (-30,-2) full sample 
  full sample 
  big small 
Intercept 0.00413 -0.000167 0.01777*** 0.01607*** 
 0.77 -0.03 3.17 3.1 
targetCAR 0.05639*** 0.05642*** 0.02706*** 0.02783*** 
 7.71 7.7 3.44 3.54 
sizeR/T 1.95E-08 -1.82E-08 2.95E-05 2.92E-05 
 0.02 -0.02 1.23 1.22 
common market factor(1) -0.00309** -0.00156  
 -2.08  -0.86  
common market factor(2)  -2.5092**  1.36023 
  -1.95  0.86 
Target TobinQ 0.000585 0.000395 0.00133* 0.00121* 
 0.93 0.64 1.94 1.79 
Target Leverage 0.000222 0.000231 -0.00027 -0.00027 
 1.08 1.13 -1.23 -1.23 
Rival TobinQ -0.00031 -0.000321 0.00122*** 0.00115*** 
 -1.41 -1.47 4.21 3.99 
Rival Leverage -3.7E-05 -3E-05 0.00011 0.00011 
 -0.45 -0.37 1.36 1.36 
Herfindahl Index 1.09E-07 8.58E-08 8.81E-07 7.92E-07 
 0.1 0.08 0.79 0.71 
Transaction Value *-0.00044487 -0.000336 ***-0.00098105 ***-0.00094752 
 -1.81 -1.38 -3.72 -3.68 
Multibidder Dummy 0.00347 0.00511 0.00311 0.00273 
 0.58 0.85 0.49 0.43 
R square 0.0483 0.0479 0.0355 0.0356 
N 1726 1726 1726 1726 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 





Panel D: (-30,-2) horizontal and non-horizontal mergers 
  horizontal non-horizontal 
  big small big small 
Intercept 0.01494* 0.00887 0.02148** 0.01559** 0.000214 -0.00304 0.00972 0.01243 
 1.65 1.04 2.57 2.03 0.03 -0.41 1.11 1.52 




0.06042*** 0.02105 0.02191* 
 5.03 5.04 2.74 3.02 5.53 5.43 1.67* 1.74 
sizeR/T 5.32E-06 1.4E-05 0.000266 0.000337 1.38E-08 -2.30E-08 2.95E-05 3.01E-05 
 0.16 0.42 0.43 0.55 0.01 -0.02 1.22 1.25 
common market 
factor(1) 
-0.00381** -0.00418*  -0.00228  0.00238  
 -1.89  -1.8  -1.01  0.79  
common market 
factor(2) 
 -5.20109  2.34814  -2.35586*  0.62877 
  -1.71  0.68  -1.74  0.35 
Target TobinQ 0.00148* 0.00138 0.00246**
* 
0.00212** -0.00154 -0.00173* -0.00054 -0.00039 
 1.75 1.64 2.79 2.42 -1.54 -1.75 -0.47 -0.34 
Target Leverage -0.00224 -0.00217 0.000176 0.000314 0.000268 0.000277 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 -1.49 -1.44 0.15 0.27 1.38 1.43 -1.32 -1.33 






 -0.26 -0.14 3.48 3 -1.6 -1.66 2.57 2.54 
Rival Leverage -2.9E-05 -2.3E-05 -0.00014 -7E-05 -0.00029 -0.00022 0.000129 0.000125 
 -0.34 -0.27 -0.49 -0.25 -0.53 -0.41 1.51 1.47 
Herfindahl Index -3.2E-06 -3.32E-06 2.59E-06 2.46E-06 1.76E-06 1.79E-06 6.43E-07 7.25E-07 



















 -2.44 -2 -2.95 -2.63 -0.36 -0.08 -1.71 -1.94 
Multibidder Dummy 0.0047 0.00511 -0.00153 -0.0013 0.00384 0.00686 0.00841 0.00763 
 0.56 0.61 -0.17 -0.15 0.45 0.8 0.9 0.81 
R square 0.0561 0.0554 0.0522 0.0492 0.0639 0.0667 0.0291 0.0287 
N 994 994 994 994 732 732 732 732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 






Panel E: (2,30) full sample 
  full sample 
  big small 
Intercept 0.00794 -0.000287 0.02179*** 0.01848*** 
 1.41 -0.05 3.3 3.02 
targetCAR 0.12937*** 0.1294*** 0.01626 0.01637 
 13 12.93 1.34 1.35 
sizeR/T 5.86E-07 5.14E-07 -1.3E-05 -1.3E-05 
 0.47 0.41 -0.44 -0.46 
common market factor(1) -0.0063***  -0.00303  
 -4.01  -1.41  
common market factor(2)  -0.93213  1.0454 
  -0.68  0.56 
Target TobinQ 0.000968 0.000536 0.00258*** 0.00234*** 
 1.46 0.81 3.15 2.9 
Target Leverage 1.09E-05 3.05E-05 -0.00051 -0.00051 
 0.05 0.14 -1.93 -1.91 
Rival TobinQ -0.00029 -0.000326 0.00143*** 0.00132*** 
 -1.28 -1.41 4.14 3.84 
Rival Leverage 6.47E-05 8.06E-05 5.46E-05 5.92E-05 
 0.75 0.94 0.57 0.61 
Herfindahl Index 4.91E-07 2.63E-07 -0.00000268** -0.00000284** 
 0.41 0.22 -2.02 -2.13 
Transaction Value -0.00027 -0.000119 -0.00093611*** -0.00085161*** 
 -1.03 -0.46 -3 -2.79 
Multibidder Dummy -0.00814 -0.00661 -0.00101 -0.00119 
 -1.29 -1.04 -0.13 -0.16 
R square 0.112 0.1029 0.0289 0.0278 
N 1726 1726 1726 1726 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 





Panel F: (2,30) horizontal and non-horizontal mergers 
  horizontal non-horizontal 
  big small big small 












0.10423*** 0.00759 0.00742 
 11.61 11.56 1.8 1.81 6.6 6.57 0.38 0.38 
sizeR/T 5.47E-08 9.4E-06 0.000561 0.000631 6.19E-07 4.69E-07 -1.6E-05 -1.7E-05 
 0 0.29 0.8 0.9 0.49 0.36 -0.53 -0.57 
common market 
factor(1) 
-0.00431** -0.00247  -0.00967*** -0.00369  
 -2.16  -0.94  -3.74  -0.99  
common market 
factor(2) 
 -4.03752  -0.98385  -0.4122  0.90112 
  -1.34  -0.25  -0.26  0.4 
Target TobinQ 0.00213** 0.00195 0.00449*** 0.00437*** -0.00067 -0.00119 -0.00084 -0.00108 
 2.51 2.3 4.45 4.36 -0.6 -1.05 -0.59 -0.77 
Target Leverage -0.0011 -0.00105 -0.00131 -0.00121 7.95E-05 0.000112 -0.00043 -0.00043 
 -0.73 -0.7 -0.98 -0.91 0.36 0.5 -1.52 -1.51 
Rival TobinQ -0.00141 -0.00129 0.00127*** 0.00121*** -0.00021 -0.00027 0.00186**
* 
0.00178** 
 -1.52 -1.4 3.28 3.16 -0.87 -1.12 2.62 2.48 
Rival Leverage 6.48E-05 7.29E-05 6.96E-05 9.99E-05 0.000366 0.000624 4.29E-05 4.54E-05 
 0.76 0.85 0.22 0.31 0.59 1 0.4 0.42 
Herfindahl Index -2.3E-06 -2.47E-06 -4.8E-06 -
0.00000491*
* 
1.61E-06 1.13E-06 -2.3E-06 -2.51E-06 
 -1.12 -1.19 -2.19 -2.23 1.06 0.73 -1.27 -1.41 












 0.22 0.64 -2.05 -1.85 -2.58 -2.05 -2.54 -2.41 
Multibidder Dummy -0.01351 -0.01289 -0.00561 -0.00545 -0.00246 8.03E-05 0.00329 0.00286 
 -1.61 -1.53 -0.56 -0.54 -0.25 0.01 0.28 0.24 
R square 0.1467 0.1438 0.0516 0.0508 0.0954 0.0766 0.0238 0.0227 
N 994 994 994 994 732 732 732 732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 
* denotes significance at 10% level.     
 
According to the table, the two newly added variables show little significance in 
the event window from one day before to one day after announcement, which indicate 
that correlation of market return is not the main factor contributing to positive rival 
CAR. Therefore, it proves that the significance in the previous seemingly unrelated 
regression is not created by the common market factor in the estimation of abnormal 
returns, but truly exists. This table strengthens the previous SUR results that rival 




Panel A presents the full sample results during event window (-1, 1) around 
target takeover announcement period. According to panel A, it is obvious that large 
rivals are very significantly affected by the original target announcement, while the 
influence on small rivals are positive but insignificant. Therefore, big rivals benefit 
more from targets’ merger announcement due to market expectation that big rivals 
might benefit from increased market efficiency. Small rivals do not benefit from 
target’s merger announcement as much as their big counterparts, indicating that the 
degree of market expectation for small rivals to benefit from market efficiency is 
much lower than the expectation for large rivals.  
Among other control variables, small rival CAR is also significantly and 
negatively affected by transaction value, while large rival CAR shows no 
significance. Lower transaction value of the original merger contribute to higher CAR 
for small rivals on original merger announcement, but do not affect large rivals. The 
relative size variable, which is the ratio of rival size to target size, is negatively but 
insignificantly related to rival CAR. Other firm-specific variables also present no 
notable significance. Industry Herfindahl index is positively but insignificantly related 
to rival CAR, which means industry concentration does not strongly increase the 
abnormal return of rival firms in that industry. The number of bidders also does not 
significantly affect rival CAR, as the multibidder dummy is not significant. 
Panel B present the subsample results of horizontal mergers and non-horizontal 
mergers. The large rival CARs in both subsamples are significantly related to target 
CAR, while small rival CARs do not show significance. Moreover, the coefficient of 
rival CAR of non-horizontal initial mergers are larger than the rival CAR coefficient 
of horizontal mergers, which indicate a stronger reaction of rival return to target 
announcement in non-horizontal initial mergers. 
Panel C and D present the regression on period before announcement. The 
results show positive and significant relations between rival CAR and target CAR for 
both big and small rivals before horizontal merger announcements, and a positive and 
significant relation for big rivals in non-horizontal mergers, while small rival CARs 
are not significantly positive dependent on target CARs in non-horizontal mergers. 
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The market beta variables do not eliminate the significance of main variable target 
CAR, so that it can also be concluded as the results above that the relation between 
rival CAR and target CAR really exists. Among other control variables, both rival and 
target Tobin’s Q exert significant influence on rival CAR. Higher Tobin’s Q 
contribute to higher rival return, which is consistent with the idea that better 
performances of both target and rival firms lead to higher rival return. Transaction 
values are positive and significant in all rival subsamples except for large rivals in 
non-horizontal mergers. 
Panel E and F present the results in the period after original merger 
announcement. The full sample results show that in this window, large rival CARs are 
significantly and positively related to target CAR, while small rivals are not much 
affected. Similar to the run-up period, large rival CARs are significant in both 
horizontal and non-horizontal initial mergers, but small rivals show more significance 
in horizontal mergers than non-horizontal mergers. This indicate that small rivals of 
horizontal initial targets are expected to be more affected by the information of 
takeover announcement during both the run-up period and the period after 
announcement, compared to the small rivals of non-horizontal merger 
announcements. It is notable that in panel E, after adjusting for market factors, small 
rival of non-horizontal mergers show little significance compared to the results of 
seemingly unrelated regression. In addition, Parameters for relative size of rival firms 
to target firms are mostly positive but insignificant. Small rival firms’ Tobin’s Q 
significantly give rise to their CAR, while target firms’ Tobin Q positively affect rival 
return only in horizontal announcement. Transaction values again negatively 
contribute to small rival firms’ CAR, and to large rival CAR in non-horizontal 
mergers. Other control variables do not have significant explanation power on rival 
CAR. 
The sample of target and rivals include financial firms, with SIC code ranging 
from 60 to 67. Because I include leverage as a control variable in my previous 
regressions, there is a concern that the leverages of financial firms are different from 
other firms, so that the leverage variable lacks enough explanation power. Therefore, I 
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exclude all financial firms from my samples and run the regressions in robustness test 
again, and the result still support the previous results that the significance of main 
variables are not affected by common market factors. The results of regressions 
without financial firms are presented in the appendix. 
In general, the regressions which included the common market factor as a control 
variable strongly support the results of the previous seemingly unrelated regressions, 
as common market factors do not disturb the influence of target abnormal return on 
rival return during merger announcement periods. The results still holds that on the 
announcement day of the original target firm, its rival firms in the same industry also 
earn positive abnormal returns. Moreover, these positive abnormal returns are mostly 
acquired by large rival firms, while small rival firms in the same industry do not get 
as much abnormal returns as their larger rivals. 
 
 
7 Summary and conclusion 
 
In this paper I study abnormal returns of rival firms of takeover targets on their 
takeover announcement. I include in my sample the takeover announcements from 
January 1990 to December 2013, and identify the rival firms as all other firms in the 
same industry as the target. All rival firms in the same industry are formed into a rival 
portfolio to be matched to each merger announcement. In order to test how the market 
size of the firm affect rival return, I further divide the rival portfolio into a portfolio 
that consists of rival firms larger than industry median market size, and a portfolio 
that contains rivals that are smaller than industry median size.  
I use event study to estimate cumulative abnormal returns of rival firms in 
selected event windows in target announcement period. The results confirm the 
findings in previous studies that rivals earn positive and significant abnormal returns 
on initial target’s merger announcement. Moreover, large rivals show significantly 
higher CAR than small rivals. Then I use cross sectional regressions to further 
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discover how rival cumulative abnormal returns are affected by target announcement 
surprises, and the results again confirm the positive return on announcement period. 
As the large rival portfolio and small rival portfolio share the same independent 
variable target CAR, I used the seemingly unrelated regression to discover the relation 
between large or small rival CAR and target CAR. The seemingly unrelated 
regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that large rival are more affected 
by target abnormal return. Also rivals of non-horizontal mergers benefit more from 
the announcement compared to rivals of horizontal mergers. Moreover, as I use the 
same market model to estimate target abnormal return and rival abnormal return over 
the same announcement period, the market return works as a common factor that 
affects both target and rival. To test whether the significant relationship between 
target and rival CAR is actually induced by the common market factor, I use a 
robustness test to prove the feasibility of previous regressions. I add a proxy for 
common market factor into the regressions and the results turned out to be not 
influential. As the large rival portfolio CAR is still significantly and positively related 
to target CAR, it is consistent with the hypothesis that large rivals gain higher returns 
than small rivals on target announcement. Therefore, I reach the conclusion that the 
market have higher expectations on large rivals to benefit from the information of 
target takeover announcement and become more competitive, while small rivals are 
less expected to benefit from the takeover announcement and become less 
competitive. 
There are still certain limitations with this paper. As discussed in the literature 
review part, the results cannot distinguish between collusion hypothesis and market 
efficiency hypothesis. This paper found that large and small rival firms differ in 
degree of their benefit from the information of initial takeover announcement, and 
concludes that larger rivals gain more abnormal return than small rivals because 
market expect large rivals to become more cost-efficient and more competitive after 
when they learn about the initial merger announcement. However, the increase in 
cumulative abnormal returns earned by rival firm can also come from expected 
collusion with the merged firm or with other rivals in the same industry. Although the 
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collusion hypothesis had been denied by previous studies, it still remains a question 
that whether the same conclusion still applies to the most recent data used in this 
paper. Moreover, the influence of takeover probability hypothesis has been largely 
reduced by eliminating all rivals that became target within one year, but still has not 
been completed eliminated. As the market cannot precisely predict which rival firm 
will become a future target, all rival firms are exposed to the market expectation of 
increased probability of being take over. Therefore, in order to clearly distinguish 
which hypothesis drives up the rival returns, future studies should further test the 
feasibility of collusion hypothesis by distinguishing challenged and unchallenged 
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Table 9 presents the results of alternative tests where I excluded all financial firms in 
my sample, as discussed before in the robustness test section.  
 
TABLE 9: Cross sectional regressions excluding financial firms 
This table regresses rival CAR on target CAR and other control variables. All variables follow the regression in robustness test. 
The only difference is that I exclude financial firms from the sample, because one of the control variables, the leverage, could be 
strongly affected if the firm is a financial firm. The dependent variable is rival CAR, and the independent variable is target CAR 
and other control variables. The market factors are the same as the ones used in robustness test. If the results of this table are 
similar to the results in robustness test and previous cross-sectional regressions, the hypothesis could be supported. 
 
Panel A: (-1,1) full sample 
  full sample 
  big small 
Intercept 0.00439** 0.00478** 0.00208 0.000769 
 2.11 2.54 1.03 0.42 
targetCAR 0.00805*** 0.00802*** 0.00611*** 0.00616*** 
 4.1 4.1 3.19 3.21 
sizeR/T -1.41E-07 -1.44E-07 -2.7E-06 -2.8E-06 
 -0.34 -0.34 -0.36 -0.37 
common market factor(1) 0.000201  -0.00088  
 0.36  -1.45  
common market factor(2)  -1.70631*  -0.43909 
  -1.89  -0.46 
Target TobinQ -0.00019 -0.000166 0.000106 7.98E-05 
 -0.86 -0.74 0.48 0.36 
Target Leverage 0.00019153*** 0.00019147*** -0.00011 -0.00011 
 2.66 2.66 -1.56 -1.56 
Rival TobinQ -3E-05 -2.7E-05 0.00038005*** 0.00036764*** 
 -0.38 -0.34 3.85 3.66 
Rival Leverage 4.51E-05 4.48E-05 -1.1E-05 -9.8E-06 
 1.56 1.55 -0.15 -0.13 
Herfindahl Index 0.00000104** 0.0000009898523** 4.09E-08 5.23E-08 
 2.45 2.33 0.11 0.14 
Transaction Value -0.00028803*** -0.00026547*** -0.0001 -6.8E-05 
 -3.16 -2.91 -1.14 -0.77 
Multibidder Dummy 0.00103 0.000834 0.000619 0.000789 
 0.46 0.38 0.29 0.37 
R square 0.0358 0.0386 0.0228 0.0214 




Panel B: (-1,1) horizontal and non-horizontal mergers 
  horizontal non-horizontal 
  big small big small 
Intercept 0.01066*** 0.01008*** 0.00293 0.0022 0.00254 0.00343 0.00379 0.00105 
 3.12 3.15 1.12 0.95 0.72 1.06 1.09 0.33 
targetCAR 0.00501** 0.005** 0.00143 0.00143 0.01295*** 0.01292*** 0.01259*** 0.01284*** 
 2.15 2.14 0.66 0.66 3.85 3.85 3.75 3.81 
sizeR/T -0.00002579** -0.00002465** -0.00024 -0.00021 -8.73E-08 -8.62E-08 -2E-06 -2.2E-06 




-0.00031  -0.00043  0.000571  -0.00216*  




 -1.58035  -1.2598  -1.98545  2.89913 
  -1.62  -1.33  -1.06  1.21 
Target 
TobinQ 
-0.0001 -7.5E-05 0.00035 0.000364 -0.00014 -0.00013 -0.00046 -0.00051 
 -0.36 -0.27 1.41 1.46 -0.33 -0.32 -1.12 -1.23 
Target 
Leverage 
-0.00023 -0.0002 -0.00057 -0.00054 0.00019503** 0.00019357** -9.7E-05 -9.7E-05 
 -0.44 -0.39 -1.29 -1.23 2.46 2.44 -1.2 -1.21 
Rival 
TobinQ 
-0.00128 -0.00127 0.00040*** 0.00040*** -1.5E-05 -9.7E-06 0.000237 5.79E-05 
 -2.11 -2.1 4.09 4.2 -0.17 -0.11 1.02 0.21 
Rival 
Leverage 
4.17E-05 4.19E-05 3.38E-05 3.33E-05 0.000155 0.000184 -8.2E-05 -7.5E-05 
 1.57 1.58 0.4 0.39 0.39 0.46 -0.62 -0.57 
Herfindahl 
Index 
9.27E-07 8.97E-07 -2.9E-07 -2.99E-07 0.00000** 0.000001* 2.57E-07 2.82E-07 
 1.38 1.34 -0.51 -0.53 1.98 1.91 0.48 0.52 
Transaction 
Value 
-0.0003001** -0.00026** -0.00011 -7.5E-05 -0.00035** -0.00033** -0.00015 -0.00012 
 -2.4 -2.11 -0.93 -0.67 -2.42 -2.27 -1.02 -0.84 
Multibidder 
Dummy 
0.00145 0.00139 0.00152 0.00153 0.000276 1.56E-05 -0.00062 -4.4E-05 
 0.53 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.08 0 -0.18 -0.01 
R square 0.0376 0.0412 0.0375 0.0395 0.0556 0.057 0.0391 0.0355 






Panel C: (-30,-2) full sample 
  full sample 
  big small 
Intercept 0.00284 -0.00122 0.02312*** 0.01821*** 
 0.46 -0.22 3.35 2.96 
targetCAR 0.05424*** 0.05447*** 0.0249*** 0.02645*** 
 6.83 6.87 2.8 2.97 
sizeR/T 3.47E-08 7.08E-09 2.85E-05 2.82E-05 
 0.03 0.01 1.09 1.08 
common market factor(1) -0.0027  -0.00321  
 -1.61  -1.52  
common market factor(2)  -3.87542  2.70141 
  -1.44  0.82 
Target TobinQ 0.000692 0.000623 0.00107 0.000926 
 1.03 0.93 1.39 1.21 
Target Leverage 0.000211 0.000221 -0.00022 -0.00023 
 0.99 1.03 -0.91 -0.92 
Rival TobinQ -0.0003 -0.000314 0.00155*** 0.00139*** 
 -1.29 -1.34 4.52 4 
Rival Leverage -5.7E-05 -5.37E-05 0.000266 0.000275 
 -0.66 -0.62 1.02 1.05 
Herfindahl Index 4.64E-07 3.79E-07 3.94E-07 5.2E-07 
 0.37 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Transaction Value -0.00048123* -0.000359 -0.00111*** -0.00103*** 
 -1.78 -1.32 -3.59 -3.39 
Multibidder Dummy 0.00409 0.00449 0.00227 0.00303 
 0.62 0.68 0.31 0.41 
R square 0.0496 0.0491 0.0376 0.0363 





Panel D: (-30,-2)horizontal and non-horizontal mergers 
  horizontal non-horizontal 
  big small big small 
Intercept 0.00707 0.00225 0.03162*** 0.01906** 0.00164 -0.00262 0.00495 0.00865 
 0.6 0.21 3 2.04 0.19 -0.33 0.49 0.95 
targetCAR ***0.04958 0.05001*** 0.02466** 0.02973** 0.05325*** 0.05354*** 0.01926 0.0199 
 4.63 4.68 2.1 2.52 4.38 4.41 1.38 1.43 
sizeR/T 2.7E-06 9.59E-06 0.000126 0.00029 1.67E-08 -4.69E-08 2.97E-05 3.02E-05 
 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.41 0.01 -0.04 1.16 1.18 
common market 
factor(1) 
-0.00271  -0.00695**  -0.00331  0.00285  
 -1.18  -2.52  -1.32  0.84  
common market 
factor(2) 
 -3.10213  1.92839  -7.90722*  -0.81045 
  -0.92  0.49  -1.66  -0.11 
Target TobinQ 0.00128 0.00126 0.00207** 0.00181* -0.00171 -0.0019* -0.00032 -0.00024 
 1.33 1.31 2.05 1.79 -1.63 -1.82 -0.26 -0.2 
Target Leverage -0.00258 -0.00247 0.00154 0.00175 0.000268 0.00028 -0.00028 -0.00028 
 -1.46 -1.4 0.86 0.98 1.33 1.39 -1.17 -1.17 
Rival TobinQ 0.00184 0.00181 0.00138*** 0.00111*** -0.00034 -0.00035 0.00244*** 0.00249*** 
 0.88 0.87 3.43 2.8 -1.53 -1.6 3.47 3 
Rival Leverage -4.9E-05 -4.6E-05 8.09E-05 9.02E-05 0.000391 0.000448 0.000582 0.000575 
 -0.54 -0.5 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.44 1.46 1.44 
Herfindahl Index -2.2E-06 -2.2E-06 7.06E-07 1.12E-06 1.81E-06 1.56E-06 1.33E-06 1.33E-06 
 -0.94 -0.94 0.31 0.49 1.22 1.04 0.82 0.82 
Transaction Value -0.00101** -0.00088537** -0.00125*** -0.000963** -9.8E-05 9.18E-05 -0.00075* -0.00081304* 
 -2.36 -2.07 -2.7 -2.14 -0.26 0.24 -1.7 -1.85 
Multibidder 
Dummy 
0.00543 0.00594 -0.00587 -0.00471 0.00486 0.00516 0.01151 0.01085 
 0.58 0.63 -0.56 -0.45 0.53 0.56 1.11 1.04 
R square 0.0667 0.0659 0.0522 0.0434 0.0611 0.0629 0.0407 0.0395 





Panel E: (2,30) full sample 
  full sample 
  big small 
Intercept 0.00941 -0.000335 0.03274*** 0.02365*** 
 1.53 -0.06 3.99 3.23 
targetCAR 0.12045*** 0.12065*** 0.01384 0.01474 
 11.68 11.64 1.01 1.07 
sizeR/T 5.93E-07 5.39E-07 -1.5E-05 -1.6E-05 
 0.47 0.42 -0.49 -0.51 
common market factor(1) -0.0064***  -0.00611**  
 -3.76  -2.42  
common market factor(2)  -4.92724*  1.3189 
  -1.79  0.33 
Target TobinQ 0.000976 0.000763 0.00188** 0.00166* 
 1.42 1.11 2.04 1.79 
Target Leverage 2.73E-05 4.91E-05 -0.00044 -0.00044 
 0.12 0.22 -1.49 -1.5 
Rival TobinQ -0.00021 -0.000244 0.00176*** 0.00157*** 
 -0.88 -1.02 4.31 3.76 
Rival Leverage 4.68E-05 5.41E-05 0.000332 0.000346 
 0.54 0.62 1.06 1.11 
Herfindahl Index 1.01E-07 2.16E-08 -0.00000402** -0.00000385** 
 0.08 0.02 -2.56 -2.45 
Transaction Value -0.00035 -0.000129 -0.00105*** **-0.00086343 
 -1.28 -0.47 -2.85 -2.38 
Multibidder Dummy -0.01015 -0.00884 -0.00523 -0.00392 
 -1.5 -1.31 -0.59 -0.44 
R square 0.1009 0.1084 0.0337 0.0293 






Panel F: (2,30): horizontal and non-horizontal mergers 
 horizontal non-horizontal 
  big small big small 
Intercept 0.0116 0.00324 0.03038** 0.02071* 0.0261*** 0.01363 0.04156*** 0.03312*** 
 1.04 0.31 2.55 1.95 2.75 1.56 3.24 2.89 
targetCAR 0.13713*** 0.13779*** 0.02382 0.02486 0.09951*** 0.10007*** 0.00762 0.00871 
 10.21 10.22 1.35 1.41 6.09 6.09 0.35 0.4 
sizeR/T -2E-05 -8.5E-06 0.00017 0.000348 6.53E-07 5.01E-07 -1.8E-05 -1.9E-05 
 -0.57 -0.24 0.21 0.44 0.51 0.39 -0.55 -0.58 
common market 
factor(1) 
**-0.00477  *-0.00557  ***-0.00938  -0.00667  
 -2.2  -1.78  -3.38  -1.55  
common market 
factor(2) 
 -2.02564  -2.10096  **-12.59166  6.79962 
  -0.63  -0.48  -2.38  0.75 
Target TobinQ 0.0022** 0.0021** 0.00395*** 0.00383*** -0.00062 -0.00108 -0.00182 -0.00197 
 2.37 2.25 3.39 3.29 -0.53 -0.93 -1.16 -1.25 
Target Leverage -0.00123 -0.00108 -0.00094 -0.00075 8.86E-05 0.000121 -0.00039 -0.00039 
 -0.73 -0.64 -0.46 -0.37 0.4 0.54 -1.27 -1.28 
Rival TobinQ -0.00317 -0.00323 0.00154*** 0.00139*** -0.00018 -0.00023 0.00259** 0.00217** 
 -1.6 -1.62 3.36 3.07 -0.76 -0.96 2.92 2.06 
Rival Leverage 6.3E-05 6.9E-05 0.000257 0.000264 -0.00096 -0.00091 0.000408 0.000427 
 0.72 0.79 0.65 0.67 -0.86 -0.81 0.81 0.84 
Herfindahl 
Index 
-2.6E-06 -2.53E-06 -0.00000683*** -0.00000659** 1.28E-06 7.99E-07 -2.9E-06 -2.88E-06 
 -1.19 -1.14 -2.59 -2.5 0.78 0.48 -1.43 -1.4 
Transaction 
Value 
1.84E-05 0.000175 -0.0011** -0.00084 -0.00109*** -0.00070674* -0.00119** -0.00109* 
 0.05 0.43 -2.09 -1.64 -2.64 -1.68 -2.13 -1.95 
Multibidder 
Dummy 
-0.01489 -0.01368 -0.00963 -0.00876 -0.00697 -0.00551 -0.00162 5.62E-05 
 -1.63 -1.5 -0.8 -0.72 -0.69 -0.54 -0.12 0 
R square 0.1532 0.1474 0.0562 0.052 0.1002 0.0907 0.0331 0.03 
N 994 994 994 994 732 732 732 732 
*** denotes significance at 1% level. 
** denotes significance at 5% level. 




The tables suggest that dropping financial firms does not affect the significance 
of the main variable, target CAR. The results in this table are similar to the results in 
table 8 in robustness test. Therefore, previous regression results are supported. 
 
